{
  "pillars": [
    {
      "id": "defense",
      "name": "Defense",
      "scores": [
        53.30442861567049,
        93.55123419278294,
        80.82101497034178
      ],
      "summary": "European purchasing and sourcing alongside US and Chinese arms-trade strength.",
      "measures": [
        {
          "label": "Joint procurement",
          "year": "EU \u00b7 2025",
          "values": [
            "24%",
            "\u2014",
            "\u2014"
          ]
        },
        {
          "label": "Equipment sourced from EU suppliers",
          "year": "EU \u00b7 major order sample since February 2022",
          "values": [
            "46.6%",
            "\u2014",
            "\u2014"
          ]
        },
        {
          "label": "External arms exports",
          "year": "US & China \u00b7 2021\u201325 \u00b7 million SIPRI volume units",
          "values": [
            "\u2014",
            "64,657",
            "8,584"
          ]
        },
        {
          "label": "External arms imports",
          "year": "US & China \u00b7 2021\u201325 \u00b7 million SIPRI volume units",
          "values": [
            "\u2014",
            "4,457",
            "2,037"
          ]
        }
      ],
      "formula": "EU = average of joint procurement \u00f7 40% target \u00d7 100, and EU sourcing share. US and China = 100 \u00d7 arms exports \u00f7 (exports + imports).",
      "limit": "The measures differ. Europe tracks joint purchasing and the origin of purchases. US and China use arms-trade balance as a proxy for industrial strength. Large exports alone cannot establish self-sufficiency or readiness.",
      "notes": "Europe uses the main-dashboard method. Its 24% collaborative procurement includes non-EU partnerships. The sourcing figure covers eight equipment categories. US and Chinese transfers include aid and second-hand weapons. SIPRI volume units are separate from prices and expenditure.",
      "sources": [
        {
          "label": "SIPRI \u00b7 arms transfers 2025",
          "url": "https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2026-03/fs_2603_at_2025.pdf"
        },
        {
          "label": "SIPRI \u00b7 definitions",
          "url": "https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers/sources-and-methods"
        },
        {
          "label": "World Bank / SIPRI \u00b7 imports",
          "url": "https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.MPRT.KD"
        },
        {
          "label": "World Bank / SIPRI \u00b7 exports",
          "url": "https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPRT.KD"
        },
        {
          "label": "EU procurement and sourcing \u00b7 main dashboard",
          "url": "index.html#defense"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "energy",
      "name": "Energy",
      "scores": [
        52.173529411764704,
        62.94117647058824,
        55.85656126645124
      ],
      "summary": "Domestic energy supply and the share of energy use supplied by renewables.",
      "measures": [
        {
          "label": "Net energy imports",
          "year": "EU 2024 \u00b7 US & China 2023",
          "values": [
            "57.3%",
            "\u22128.70%",
            "23.35%"
          ]
        },
        {
          "label": "Renewables in final energy use",
          "year": "EU 2025 provisional \u00b7 US & China 2020",
          "values": [
            "26.2%",
            "11.00%",
            "14.90%"
          ]
        }
      ],
      "formula": "Half the score = 100 minus net imports, limited to 0\u2013100. Half = renewables \u00f7 42.5% \u00d7 100, capped at 100.",
      "limit": "The formula is shared, but the years and accounting differ. Europe uses newer Eurostat figures. US and China use older World Bank/IEA data, which misses subsequent renewable growth.",
      "notes": "EU net imports use gross available energy and renewables use gross final consumption under EU rules. US and Chinese international-series definitions differ. The 42.5% reference is the EU\u2019s 2030 goal and a scoring convention for US and China. Net exporters receive 100 import-independence points. Fuel and supplier concentration remain gaps.",
      "sources": [
        {
          "label": "World Bank / IEA \u00b7 net energy imports",
          "url": "https://api.worldbank.org/v2/country/EUU;USA;CHN/indicator/EG.IMP.CONS.ZS?date=2023&format=json"
        },
        {
          "label": "World Bank / IEA \u00b7 renewable energy",
          "url": "https://api.worldbank.org/v2/country/EUU;USA;CHN/indicator/EG.FEC.RNEW.ZS?date=2020&format=json"
        },
        {
          "label": "EU energy figures \u00b7 main dashboard",
          "url": "index.html#energy"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "id": "technology",
      "name": "Technology",
      "scores": [
        31.25,
        64.82494516472569,
        76.49342614529205
      ],
      "summary": "Chip industry and cloud supply, with different measures of domestic strength.",
      "measures": [
        {
          "label": "Chip value-chain global revenue share",
          "year": "EU \u00b7 2025 \u00b7 against 20% target",
          "values": [
            "8.8%",
            "\u2014",
            "\u2014"
          ]
        },
        {
          "label": "Chip demand supplied by EU production",
          "year": "EU \u00b7 2024",
          "values": [
            "22%",
            "\u2014",
            "\u2014"
          ]
        },
        {
          "label": "European cloud-provider revenue share",
          "year": "Wider Europe \u00b7 2025 estimate",
          "values": [
            "15%",
            "\u2014",
            "\u2014"
          ]
        },
        {
          "label": "Global chip-making capacity",
          "year": "US & China \u00b7 2024",
          "values": [
            "\u2014",
            "9.9%",
            "25.3%"
          ]
        },
        {
          "label": "Chip exports",
          "year": "2024 \u00b7 integrated circuits, HS 8542 \u00b7 USD",
          "values": [
            "\u2014",
            "$51.2bn",
            "$161.6bn"
          ]
        },
        {
          "label": "Chip imports",
          "year": "2024 \u00b7 integrated circuits, HS 8542 \u00b7 USD",
          "values": [
            "\u2014",
            "$41.3bn",
            "$386.5bn"
          ]
        },
        {
          "label": "Domestic cloud providers among six leaders",
          "year": "US & China \u00b7 Q2 2024",
          "values": [
            "\u2014",
            "6 of 6",
            "6 of 6"
          ]
        }
      ],
      "formula": "US and China: equal thirds for chip-making capacity, chip trade and domestic cloud providers. Capacity is scored against 25.3%; trade = exports \u00f7 (exports + imports) \u00d7 100; cloud = domestic providers \u00f7 six \u00d7 100. EU keeps its main-dashboard method.",
      "limit": "Trade adds a view of import dependence, but imported chips can go into exported electronics. Factory capacity misses chip sophistication; cloud rankings miss market share. EU uses different measures, so this remains a rough comparison.",
      "notes": "US = average of capacity 39.1304348, chip trade 55.3444007 and cloud 100 = 64.8249452. China = average of capacity 100, chip trade 29.4802784 and cloud 100 = 76.4934261. Capacity uses 2024 wafer starts irrespective of factory ownership or chip sophistication; 25.3% is the largest share among EU, US and China. Trade uses reported 2024 gross flows for HS 8542 from UN Comtrade via World Bank WITS. In USD thousands: US exports 51,242,866.01 and imports 41,346,204.16; China exports 161,590,484.83 and imports 386,540,311.09. Balanced trade earns 50 trade points; this is not the share of demand supplied domestically. Re-exports, reimports and repeated border crossings are included. Chips embedded in finished electronics, chip-making equipment and offshore design income are not captured by HS 8542. Cloud counts domestic headquarters among six leaders, with equal weight per firm. Chip-company revenue is excluded for US/China. EU retains its original method: half chip revenue target attainment and half the average of domestic chip supply and European cloud share; its cloud market includes the UK.",
      "sources": [
        {
          "label": "IDC / Commission \u00b7 chip-making capacity",
          "url": "https://zenodo.org/records/21931219"
        },
        {
          "label": "Commission \u00b7 cloud providers, table 1",
          "url": "https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52026SC0502"
        },
        {
          "label": "Synergy \u00b7 cloud markets",
          "url": "https://www.srgresearch.com/articles/cloud-is-a-global-market-apart-from-china"
        },
        {
          "label": "EU Technology calculation \u00b7 main dashboard",
          "url": "index.html#technology"
        },
        {
          "label": "World Bank / UN Comtrade \u00b7 US chip exports, 2024",
          "url": "https://wits.worldbank.org/trade/comtrade/en/country/USA/year/2024/tradeflow/Exports/partner/ALL/product/8542"
        },
        {
          "label": "World Bank / UN Comtrade \u00b7 US chip imports, 2024",
          "url": "https://wits.worldbank.org/trade/comtrade/en/country/USA/year/2024/tradeflow/Imports/partner/ALL/product/8542"
        },
        {
          "label": "World Bank / UN Comtrade \u00b7 China chip exports, 2024",
          "url": "https://wits.worldbank.org/trade/comtrade/en/country/CHN/year/2024/tradeflow/Exports/partner/ALL/product/8542"
        },
        {
          "label": "World Bank / UN Comtrade \u00b7 China chip imports, 2024",
          "url": "https://wits.worldbank.org/trade/comtrade/en/country/CHN/year/2024/tradeflow/Imports/partner/ALL/product/8542"
        }
      ],
      "calculation_inputs": {
        "weights": {
          "capacity": 0.3333333333333333,
          "chip_trade": 0.3333333333333333,
          "cloud": 0.3333333333333333
        },
        "capacity_percent": {
          "US": 9.9,
          "China": 25.3
        },
        "capacity_reference_percent": 25.3,
        "trade_year": 2024,
        "trade_product": "HS 8542",
        "trade_unit": "USD thousands",
        "exports": {
          "US": 51242866.01,
          "China": 161590484.83
        },
        "imports": {
          "US": 41346204.16,
          "China": 386540311.09
        },
        "cloud_domestic_top_six": {
          "US": 6,
          "China": 6
        }
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "economy",
      "name": "Economy",
      "scores": [
        53.09503897146374,
        58.681675971984234,
        78.81720843950293
      ],
      "summary": "Trade vulnerability in three strategic supply chains, converted to points using a fixed logarithmic scale.",
      "measures": [
        {
          "label": "Chip supply-chain vulnerability",
          "year": "2023 \u00b7 lower index means less exposure",
          "values": [
            "0.22",
            "0.20",
            "0.18"
          ]
        },
        {
          "label": "Clean-tech vulnerability",
          "year": "2023 \u00b7 lower index means less exposure",
          "values": [
            "0.18",
            "0.28",
            "0.10"
          ]
        },
        {
          "label": "Raw-material vulnerability",
          "year": "2023 \u00b7 lower index means less exposure",
          "values": [
            "0.28",
            "0.31",
            "0.24"
          ]
        },
        {
          "label": "Existing industrial-target score",
          "year": "EU only \u00b7 unchanged from main-dashboard method",
          "values": [
            "41.0",
            "\u2014",
            "\u2014"
          ]
        }
      ],
      "formula": "For each supply chain: points = min(100, 100 \u00d7 \u2212log\u2081\u2080(vulnerability)). Average the three point scores. US and China use this directly. EU = half resilience + half its existing industrial-target score.",
      "limit": "The 0.10 reference is our trial scoring choice, not an official target. Logs reward proportional reductions in vulnerability and allow strong areas to offset weak ones. EU still includes industrial targets; US and China do not.",
      "notes": "Inputs are the existing 2023 EXVI values for chips, clean technology and raw materials, with equal weights. For each input v, calculate 100 \u00d7 \u2212log10(v) and cap that sector at 100; only then average the three sector scores. This is the agreed order, so one exceptionally low vulnerability cannot earn more than 100 sector points. The following uncapped natural-log averages are retained only as diagnostic values; the displayed score uses base-10 logs and per-sector caps. EU raw log = 1.5006306121781965, US = 1.3511955232499775, China = 1.8148332922420394. Reference examples: vulnerability 1 gives 0 points, 0.3162 about 50, 0.20 about 69.9 and 0.10 gives 100. Scores no longer give the best peer an automatic 100, although the underlying EXVI still depends on its source normalization. EXVI is an index, not a probability of disruption. No input here is zero; a verified zero would receive the limiting capped score of 100, while the raw log remains undefined. The manufacturing-only addition for US/China has been removed. EU retains its original target score of 41.0185185, averaging manufacturing coverage, mineral diversification and circular material use. Finance, services and individual supply-chain bottlenecks remain gaps.",
      "sources": [
        {
          "label": "Commission \u00b7 External Vulnerability Index comparison",
          "url": "https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/circabc-ewpp/d/d/workspace/SpacesStore/475d6e99-55ba-41bf-920d-1da2b44fdeb3/download"
        },
        {
          "label": "Authors \u00b7 index methodology",
          "url": "https://www.intereconomics.eu/contents/year/2025/number/1/article/external-vulnerability-index-a-tool-to-assess-trade-weaknesses.html"
        },
        {
          "label": "EU Economy calculation \u00b7 main dashboard",
          "url": "index.html#economy"
        }
      ],
      "calculation_inputs": {
        "vulnerabilities": {
          "EU": [
            0.22,
            0.18,
            0.28
          ],
          "US": [
            0.2,
            0.28,
            0.31
          ],
          "China": [
            0.18,
            0.1,
            0.24
          ]
        },
        "log_base": 10,
        "raw_mean_negative_logs": {
          "EU": 1.5006306121781965,
          "US": 1.3511955232499775,
          "China": 1.8148332922420394
        },
        "reference_vulnerability": 0.1,
        "cap_applied": "Cap each transformed sector score at 100, then average the three sector scores.",
        "resilience_scores": [
          65.17155942440895,
          58.68167597198423,
          78.81720843950293
        ],
        "eu_industrial_target_score": 41.01851851851852,
        "us_china_manufacturing_addition": "removed",
        "sector_points": {
          "EU": [
            65.75773191777937,
            74.4727494896694,
            55.28419686577808
          ],
          "US": [
            69.89700043360187,
            55.28419686577808,
            50.863830616572734
          ],
          "China": [
            74.4727494896694,
            100,
            61.9788758288394
          ]
        }
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "information",
      "name": "Information",
      "scores": [
        51.01302793,
        88.07094907135185,
        null
      ],
      "summary": "Four equally weighted areas of media consumption. China is excluded because comparable coverage is incomplete.",
      "measures": [
        {
          "label": "Cinema & TV",
          "year": "EU \u00b7 three viewing channels / US \u00b7 cinema only",
          "values": [
            "28.7",
            "95.5 \u2248",
            "\u2014"
          ]
        },
        {
          "label": "Music",
          "year": "2025 \u00b7 national year-end top ten charts",
          "values": [
            "58.7",
            "90.0",
            "\u2014"
          ]
        },
        {
          "label": "News",
          "year": "2026 \u00b7 leading brands and ownership",
          "values": [
            "77.8",
            "75.0",
            "\u2014"
          ]
        },
        {
          "label": "Social media for news",
          "year": "2025 \u00b7 creator base and platform ownership",
          "values": [
            "38.9",
            "91.8 \u2248",
            "\u2014"
          ]
        }
      ],
      "formula": "Four areas, each worth 25%. US = average of 95.5, 90.0, 75.0 and 91.8, calculated before rounding. EU follows the main dashboard.",
      "limit": "The broader US score is provisional. Its screen measure covers cinema only, while Europe includes broadcast and streaming. Social-platform surveys ask different questions. These gaps matter when comparing the totals.",
      "notes": "Cinema: EU averages cinema admissions, broadcast film minutes and streaming viewing. US uses 2023 domestic film share of box-office revenue as its screen proxy. Music: nine of the 2025 US top-ten tracks feature wholly US artists. The mixed Korean/US collaboration APT earns zero domestic points in this conservative version. News: offline domestic leading-brand reach is 62/85 and online 47/61, averaged equally. Generic local-TV entries are unresolved. Social: 14 of 15 nominated creators have US professional bases. US-controlled platforms account for 111 of 123 summed news-use responses across six services. TikTok is coded by its 2025 ownership. Europe uses a separate Eurobarometer platform-importance question covering 12 services. All categories measure selected uses or chart slots; audiences can overlap. Reuters covers the US, Hong Kong and Taiwan, with no mainland China survey.",
      "sources": [
        {
          "label": "Commission \u00b7 EU cinema share, page 54",
          "url": "https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12608-2025-INIT/en/pdf#page=54"
        },
        {
          "label": "European Audiovisual Observatory \u00b7 US, page 44",
          "url": "https://rm.coe.int/focus2024/1680b5a5bf#page=44"
        },
        {
          "label": "Reuters \u00b7 2026 market coverage",
          "url": "https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/digital-news-report/2026"
        },
        {
          "label": "Reuters \u00b7 US 2026",
          "url": "https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/digital-news-report/2026/united-states"
        },
        {
          "label": "US offline brand reach",
          "url": "https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/uqnEW/2/"
        },
        {
          "label": "US online brand reach",
          "url": "https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/xLiBC/2/"
        },
        {
          "label": "Billboard \u00b7 US year-end Hot 100, 2025",
          "url": "https://www.billboard-japan.com/charts/detail?a=uhot100_year&year=2025"
        },
        {
          "label": "Reuters \u00b7 US creators, 2025",
          "url": "https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/news-creators-influencers/2025/United-States"
        },
        {
          "label": "Reuters \u00b7 15 nominated US creators",
          "url": "https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/ZREMa/5/"
        },
        {
          "label": "Reuters \u00b7 US platform news use, 2025",
          "url": "https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/0GgM6/1/"
        },
        {
          "label": "EU four-part Information method",
          "url": "index.html#information"
        }
      ],
      "supplement": "<h2>What unresolved cases change</h2><p>US news ranges from 75 to 100 if all unidentified local-TV entries qualify as domestic. Giving full US credit to the mixed music collaboration and all unresolved news entries would raise the US Information score to 96.8. That scenario leaves the cinema and survey-coverage gaps unresolved.</p>"
    }
  ],
  "date": "2026-11-10",
  "overall_method": "EU and US: equal-weight average of five pillars (20% each). China: equal-weight average of four pillars (25% each), excluding Information. Totals differ in coverage. EU uses the main dashboard methodology; US and China use alternative proxies where evidence differs.",
  "totals": {
    "EU": 48.16720498577978,
    "US": 73.6139961742866,
    "China": 72.997052705397
  }
}